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CARITA'rrvo

F. No.19603.

C.2d

v. TEE'rs

In Bank.

BAHT LUIS CARI'l'A'l'IVO,
TEETS, as ·warden of State

Nov.

HAHLEY 0.
Respondent.

Criminal Law-Judgment-Execution of Death Penalty-Sanity Investigation.-In view of Pen. Code, §§ 3700, 3701, declarthat courts shall not suspend execution of a judgment of
death and providing for a judicial proceeding to determine
the question of defendant's present
only when the
warden of the state prison inyokes such
proceeding, a writ
of mandate will not issue to compel the warden to institute
proceedings to determine the present sanity of a prisoner in
his custody awaiting execution of the death penalty after the
warden has determined that then~ is not "good reason to
believe" such prisoner is presently insane.
[2] !d.-Judgment--Execution of Death Penalty-Sanity Investigation.-"Due process" does not prevent delegation of the
duty of determining the sanity of a person awaiting execution
of the death penalty to an administrative official, and judicial
review of that officer's determination is not required. (Overruling any statements in Phyle v. Duffy, :~4 CaL2d 144, 208 P.2d
668, which imply a contrary view.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin
County denying petition for writ of mandate and for an order
directing issuance of remittitur. ,Jordan L. Martinelli, Judge.
Appeal dismissed on motion.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel warden of state prison
to institute proceeding for determination of sanity of a prisoner under sentence of death. Appeal from denial of writ,
dismissed; stay of execution theretofore granted, terminated.
George T. Davis for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
McCOMB, .T.-This is a motion to dismiss an appeal from
an order denying a petition for a vvrit of mandate and also
for an order directing the issnanee of the remittitur forthwith.
[1] Ser Cal.Jur.2d, .JudgnH'nts, § 391.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 1043.
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on
31, 1956.
for defend~
were of the
was sane.
three
on the medical unit
Prison at
to wit, David
R:JCJim.tuL. M.D., Chief
M. M. .LUJ'""''"~-¥ M.D.,
uu::uu.;s. M.D., Chief Medical
advised the
warden relative to defendant:
''We are
he has some expansive grandiose ideas
and feelings
but no delusions or hallucinations
are elicited and
knows
crime of which he was convicted
and sentenced to execution and we are agreed he is not insane,
albeit he has a Paranoid Personality with some Schizoid and
some Neurotic Elements.''
March
1956, Dr. Willcutts, Dr. Schmidt and
Dr.,..,.. '
all on
advised the warden relative
to defendant :
"He shows he is oriented well in all
that he has a
memory and still
some evidence of some expansive
"u21n.uv,se ideas and
of persecution. He has a Para~
noid Personality with some Schizoid and Neurotic elements;
we are all
that he is not
''
May 1956, Dr.
Dr. Schmidt and A. D.
n..tnJae. M.D.,
all on
prison staff, informed
the warden relative to ue.LeuuaJuL
''He knows the crime
which he is sentenced, but he
does not know, or will not say definitely where his case is in
the courts, but feels that Mr. Davis will take good care
of
case.
memory, he is oriented in all
'This subject has a
from wrong, is aware of the .crime for
knows
which he faces execution. He
was sentenced
exhibits some
ideas and
of persecution, but
we are all
he is not insane. He has a paranoid
Pel~sonal.ItJ' with schizoid and neurotic elements.''
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IX. On
Dr. Schmidt and Dr.
Kopac advised the warden
defendant:
''This subject has a good memory, is oriented in all spheres.
He knows right from wrong and is aware of the crime for
which he was sentenced and for which he faces execution.
He exhibits many
ideas and
of persecution;
but we are all agreed that he is not
insane. He has
a Paranoid Personality with many Schizoid and Neurotic
Elements.''
The record fails to disclose any evidence
the
findings of the doctors as set forth above.
x. On .August 30, 1956, defendant filed a petition for a writ
of mandate in the Superior Court of Marin County seeking
to compel the warden of San Quentin penitentiary to institute
proceedings to determine the present sanity of defendant.
The writ was denied by the superior court on the same elate
and a notice of appeal immediately filed with this court. On
August 31, 1956, a stay of execution pending the appeal from
the order denying the petition for a writ of mandate was
granted.
[1] This is the sole question ueeessary for us to determine:
In view of the provisions of sections 3'700 and 370P of the
Penal Code, will a writ of mandate 1"ssue to compel the warden
of the state pen·itentiary to institute proceedings to determine
the present sanity of a prisoner in his custody awaiting
execution of the death penalty after the warden has determined that there is not "good reason to believe" such pr,isoner
is presently insane?
No. The method of determining the question of the sanity
of a person awaiting execution is controlled by the Legislature.

'Section 3700 of the Penal Code reads: "No judge, court, or officer,
other than the Governor, can suspend the execution of a judgment
of death, except the warden of the State prison to whom he is
delivered for execution, as provided in the six succeeding sections,
unless an appeal is taken."
Section 3701 of the Penal Code reads: "If, after his delivery to the
warden for execution, there is good reason to believe that a defendant,
under judgment of death, has become insane, the warden must call
such fact to the attention of the district attorney of the county in
which the prison is situated, whose duty it is to immediately file in the
superior court of such county a petition, stating the conviction and
judgment, and the fact that the defendant is believed to be insane,
and asking that the question of his sanity be inquired into. 'rhereupon
the court must at once cause to be summoned and impaneled, from the
regular jury list of the county, a jury of 12 persons to hmt.r such
inquiry."
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in Penal Code section 3700
the execution of a judgment
in section 3701 of the Penal
to determine the question of
only when the warden invokes such
30 Cal.2d 838 at 843 [2] [186
It is settled that "due

' does not prevent
of the duty of determining the sanity of a person
awaiting execution of the death penalty to an administrative
official, and judicial review of that officer's determination is
not required. ("tlcCracken v. Teets, 41 Cal.2d 648 at 653 [7]
P.2d 561]2; Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 [70 S.Ct.
457 at 459
, 94 J_~.Ed. 604] ; Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S.
398 at 405 et seq. [18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed. 515] .)
Any statements in Phyle v. Duffy, 34 CaL2d 144 [208 P.2d
668], which imply a contrary view are overruled.
For the reasons above stated the motion to dismiss the
appeal is granted and the stay of execution heretofore granted
is terminated. r~et the remittitur issue forthwith.
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment and, generally,
in the discussion insofar as it relates to petitioner's claimed
right to judicial review of the administrative act of the
warden. (lVIandamus is not a proper vehicle for asserting
the right here involved. See concurring and dissenting opinion, Phyle v. Duffy (1949), 34 Cal.2d 144, 170 [208 P.2d 668] .)
I do not, however, concur in any possible implication that
an insane person may be executed or that the right to the
writ of habeas corpus may be suspended or denied absolutely
as to persons who are insane or who are under sentence of
death, merely because they have been so adjudicated.
'Justice Schauer, speaking :for this court, with whom Chief Justice
Gibson and Justices Shenk and Edmonds concurred, said in the cited
case at page 653 [7]: "Petitioner asserts that he is denied due process
o:f law i:f he is not accorded judicial review o:f the question whether
there is good reason to believe that he has become insane. It has been
held that :federal due process accords him no such right. (Citation.)"
On page 654 o:f the same case, Justice Traynor, with whom Justice
Spence concurred, said: "Procedural due process does not prevent
delegation o:f the duty o:f determining the sanity o:f a person under
judgment o:f death to an administrative official and does not require
judicial review o:f that official's determination. (Citations.)"

''Three.
'!'he Constitution of
that "The
or
shall not be
may
it.'' The Constitution
Invasion the public
deelares the same fundamental
of California
right.
The Penal Code, section 1473, implementing the Constitution, declares that "Every person unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of his liberty, under any
may
prosecute a ·writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause
of such imprisonment or restraint." Section 1474 provides
that the petition for the writ (which may be signed either
by the party for whose relief it is intended or by some person
in his behalf) shall specify "If the imprisonment is alleged
to be illegal . . . in what the alleged illegality consists.''
The illegality may consist in the fact that a warden of a
prison refuses to obey the law: a prisoner is insane, is known
to the warden to be insane, and is nevertheless being held by
the warden for the purpose of executing a sentence of death
while the prisoner remains insane. In such a case the order
granting the writ of habeas corpus vvould not require the
release of the prisoner from all custody (Pen. Code, § 1486)
but should release him from the illegal detention; i. e., the
detention which, if not limited, will culminate in illegal execution and, if the prisoner
in the
of the superintendent of a hospital for the criminal insane for safekeeping
and treatment rather than in the custody of the warden of a
state prison for execution, the writ may so order (Pen. Code,
§§ 1487, subd. 5, 1493).
Section 3700 of the Penal Code, providing that "No judge,
court, or officer, other than the Governor, can suspend the
execution of a judgment of death, except the warden of the
State prison to whom he is delivered for execution, as provided
in the six succeeding sections, unless an appeal is taken," by
its own provision has no application to the powers of the
court or a judge when an appeal has been taken and manifestly
it cannot, by express prohibition of the Constitutions of both
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operate to
of the citizens to
writs of habeas
of execution as may be appropriate.
issue a writ of habeas corpus in a
the power
execution. The
issuance of the writ must as a necessary incident effect
the writ has been
or an approelse the writ could not be obeyed. Sections
be construed, as their own
of the dnties of a warden
when "there is good reason to believe that a defendunder judgment of death, has become insane," or "that
a female . . .
like commitment] is pregnant." ( Certain duties are also imposed upon the district attorney by
the mentioned sections in the contemplated circumstances.)
But sueh sections do not ptwport to cover the situation where
the warden fails to obey the law.
Certainly no provision in chapter 2 (of tit. 3, pt. 3) of the
Penal Code (the chapter containing sections 3700 to 3706,
inelusive) purports to declare that the warden of a prison
is above the law and his acts beyond cognizance of the courts.
Neither does any provision of law purport to authorize the
execution of an insane person or a pregnant woman, or to
suspend, in contravention of the Constitutions of the United
States and of the State of California, the issuance of writs of
habeas corpus or the inherent power of the court, or a justice
in such cases to stay execution.
The constitutional provisions safeguarding the writ of
habeas corpus ad snbjicienclum are wise. The right to that
writ was hard won by our ancestors. It gained formal recognition as the vehicle for inquiring into the lawfulness of the
restraint of a person detained in another's custody upon
passage of the Petition of Right (16 Ohas. I, ch. 10, § 8) and
the subsequent passage iu 1679 of the Habeas Corpus Act
Chas. II, ch.
It should not be stricken down in
whole or whittled away in part by any decision of this court.
To hold it inapplicable in the case of prisoners under sentence
of death who are insane, or who are pregnant, would mean
that, conceivably, a warden, knowing full well that a prisoner
was a lunatic, completely bereft of reason, unknowing the
act for which he was sentenced or even that he was to be
punished, could proceed with the execution. Likewise, such
a warden, knowing that a female under death sentence was

the
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about to be delivered of
could proceed with the execution
of the convicted prisoner
as an incident thereof, of the
unborn infant. And, the writ of habeas eorpus being suspended in such cases, no court or judge eould stay the
execution. (See majority
in In re Phyle (1947), 30
Cal.2d 838, 850
P.2d
; see also
opinion,
id., 851 et seq.; see
and
opinion, Phyle v.
Duffy (1949), supra, 34 OaL2d 144, 163 et seq. Phyle v.
Duffy (1948 , 334 U.S. 431
S.Ct.
92 L.Ed. 1494],
concurring opinion of Mr. ;rusti(:e
pp. 444-445
of 334 U.S.)
The concept of
mandamus
superior eourt civil
proceeding carrying with it a right to appeal and ensuing
delay) as a substitute for habeas corpus was an unfortunate
expedient which had better never have been innovated. (See
In re Phyle (1947), S1tpra; Phyle v. D1tj]y (1948), S1LpTa, 334
U.S. 431; Phyle v. Duffy (1949), supra, 34 Cal.2d 144, 147,
167, 171.) I am glad to concur in holding that such remedy
is inapplicable.
There should be few, if any, unjustified delays attendant
upon use of the conventional vehicle, habeas corpus, upon
proper showings. 'fhis court will not issue such writ upon
tardy application or the mere averment of conclusions, or of
the ultimate fact, or of general statements of facts. The
principles enunciated in In re Swa·in (1949), 34 Cal.2d 300,
304 [209 P.2d 793], should be strictly applied in all related
situations. (See also People v. Shorts (1948), 32 Cal.2d 502,
506 [197 P.2c1330].)
For the reasons, and with the limitations, above stated, I
concur in the orders dismissing the appeal, terminating the
stay of execution and issuing the remittitur forthwith.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-~Because it is
and always has been my view that mandamus is not available
to determine the sanity of a person under sentence of death
and that habeas corpus is the only remedy available to such
a person, I concur in the order for the dismissal of the
appeaL I dissent from the holding in the majority opinion
that there can be no judicial review of the determination of
the warden as to the sanity of a person under sentence of
death as it is my opinion that habeas corpus is available to
review such a determination. (See concurring and dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Schauer in Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal.2d
144 [208 P.2d 668], and my dissent in McCracken v. Teets,
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. ) I agree with the views
Mr. Justice Schauer in his
opmwn
in the case at bar with
to the availability of the writ
of habeas eorpus m a case such as this, and on the record
before us, such
should be available to the petitioner
here.

No. 5795.

In Bank.

Nov. 20, 1956.]

'l'HE PEOPLE, Hesponclent, v. LEONARD LYONS,
Appellant.

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

Criminal Law-Conduct of Counsel-Asking Improper Questions.-\Vhere defendant has not yet testified as a witness, it
is improper for the prosecuting attorney on cross-examination
of defendant's wife to allude to a prior conviction of defendant
under another name.
Lewdness-Evidence-Complaint.-Courts look with disfavor
on a complaint made long after the event on which a charge
of lewd conduct with a child is based.
Criminal Law-Appeal-Objections-Conduct of Counsel.Generally, if the harmful effect of improper statements of the
prosecuting attorney could probably be removed by an admonition to the jury, failure to request such admonition waives the
right to rely on the statements as misconduct.
!d.-Appeal-Objections-Conduct of CounseL-Where misconduct of the prosecuting attorney is of such a character that
it cannot be purged of its harmful effect by an admonition, it
will be considered as a possible ground for reversal in cases
in which the jury has been admonished, as well as in cases
in which no objection was made or admonition requested.
!d.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-Where the case is closely balanced and guilt is not
so clearly established as to render it improbable that the
harmful effect of misconduct by the prosecuting attorney may
have turned the scales against the accused, such misconduct is
ground for reversal.

[1] See Am.Jur., Trial, § 459.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 610; [2] Lewdness,
§ 16;
Criminal Law, § 1096; [4] Criminal Law, § 1105; [5]
Criminal Law,§ 1403; [6] Criminal Law,§ 587; [7] Criminal Law,
§ 104; [8] Criminal Law, ~ 1341(2); [9, 10] Criminal Law, § 1322
(1); [11] Criminal Law,§ 1324(1); [12, 14] Lewdness, § 19; [13]
Lewdness, § 21.

